Tag Archives: Criminal attorney

Criminal Record Expungements: More Good Stuff


In the realm of law, in between the nether world and the iclouds, there is a place where things sometimes seem pretty darn good. Doesn’t mean it is! Or forever will be – but, for now, good. This This is where we find the following two cases (case law):

Shanks v. State, 83 So.3d 1226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)

Baker v. State, 53 So.3d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)

Both of these cases, for the time being, stop the practice of the State Attorneys going to court unarmed and arguing away a client’s chance to seal or expunge their criminal record without producing a single shred of evidence on which the Court could hang its hat.  With these cases (and others) defense counsel is now sitting in the cat-bird’s seat!

Er, ahh, … for now…

English: Excerpt from the swiss criminal recor...

Redacted Record.

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Double-Jeopardy Issues with Suspended License Cases


Defendant and Counsel (1895), by Yeames, an ex...

Defendant and Counsel (1895), by Yeames, an example of the problem picture, which invites the viewer to speculate on the woman’s alleged crime and on whether or not she may be guilty. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Just a quick post on double-jeopardy issues with suspended license cases

Early on, prior to the Blockberger case, a person could be found guilty of Driving While License Suspended [DWLS] and No Valid Drivers License [NVDL]. Lanier v. State, 226 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969).  Then, some 31 years later, the 5th DCA decided that a Defendant cannot be found guilty of both DWLS and NVDL. Roedel v. State, 773 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

A Defendant cannot be found guilty twice for a single episode of DWLS. Hallman v. State, 492 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).

A Defendant cannot be found guilty of Felony DWLS [F-DWLS] and DWLS-HTO for same act. Franklin v. State, 816 So.2d 1203 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

A Defendant can be found guilty of DWLS with permanently revoked [DWLS-PR] license and DWLS-HTO for same act. Webb v. State, 816 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

Now it gets confusing . . .
Can a Defendant be found guilty of Driving While License Suspended AND Driving While License Suspended as a Habitual Traffic Offender?

The state may prosecute for violation of DWLS and DWLS as a Habitual Traffic Offender [DWLS-HTO] under “same elements test” and is not double jeopardy. State v. Cooke, 767 So.2d 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

but, . . .

A Defendant cannot be found guilty of DWLS and DWLS-HTO based on “primary evil” under “degree variants” analysis. Duff v. State, 942 So.2d 926 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

but wait, . . .

A Defendant can be found guilty of DWLS and DWLS-HTO based on “degree variants” analysis (completely avoiding “primary evil” test, no mention of Duff case, and a confusing look at “penalties,” whether they are “moving violations,” if they receive “points,” etc.). State v. Gil, 68 So.3d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

When someone figures out what the Gil case is trying to say please comment or contact me and let me know.

Enjoy

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Fellow Officer Rule – Not a Rule of Evidence


Stafford Police Department making a traffic st...

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I’m way behind, I know.  We just moved our office and just getting settled and, thank God, we have been busy.  I wanted to highlight the case below because it addresses the fellow officer rule and the establishment of probable cause for a stop.  Stop motions can sometimes win a case and the fellow officer rule has been used by prosecutors to skirt the need to have the stopping officer present at suppression hearings (or get around the fact that the stopping officer fails to appear).  This case also follows the Second District Court of Appeal’s reasoning which seems to always be a step or two ahead of the rest of the state.

FLORIDA vs. BOWERS, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S136a (Fla. Feb 23, 2012):
(PER CURIAM.) We have for review the decision of Bowers v. State, 23 So. 3d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), in which the Second District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Ferrer v. State, 785 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
The conflict issue involves the application of the fellow officer rule to testimony in a motion to suppress hearing where the defendant is challenging the validity of a traffic stop. We hold that the fellow officer rule does not allow an officer who does not have firsthand knowledge of the traffic stop and was not involved in the investigation at that time to testify as to hearsay regarding what the initial officer who conducted the stop told him or her for the purpose of proving a violation of the traffic law so as to establish the validity of the initial stop. For the reasons explained below, we approve Bowers and disapprove Ferrer.
The certified conflict issue requires us to determine whether the fellow officer rule allows an officer who was not involved in the initial traffic stop or in the investigation at the time of the stop to testify about the basis for the initial stop during an evidentiary suppression hearing in order to establish probable cause for the initial stop. In Ferrer, the Fourth District extended the fellow officer rule to allow this hearsay testimony in a suppression hearing to support probable cause for the initial stop; in Bowers, the Second District disagreed, expressly holding that the fellow officer rule was never intended to be a rule of evidence that allows for the admission of hearsay evidence under these circumstances.
The Second District in Bowers accurately set forth the purpose of the fellow officer rule as a rule developed to assist officers investigating in the field to make arrests and conduct searches:

The fellow officer rule provides a mechanism by which officers can rely on their collective knowledge to act in the field. Under this rule, the collective knowledge of officers investigating a crime is imputed to each officer and one officer may rely on the knowledge and information possessed by another officer to establish probable cause. It can involve direct communications between officers who have sufficient information and the officer who stops the suspect, or it can involve general communications among officers of whom at least one possesses the required level of suspicion.
Under the rule, one officer may rely on the knowledge and information possessed by another officer to establish probable cause for an arrest for a felony or misdemeanor offense or to establish probable cause for a search.

In other words, an officer in the field may need to act immediately based upon what he or she is told by a fellow officer. However, the Second District correctly recognized that the fellow officer rule is not a rule of evidence.

In Florida, the fellow officer rule provides that if an officer relies on a chain of evidence to formulate the existence of probable cause for an arrest or a search and seizure, the rule does not require the officer to possess personal knowledge of each link in the chain of information if the collective knowledge of all the officers supports a finding of probable cause. The rule allows an officer to testify to a previous link in the chain for the purpose of justifying his or her own conduct. However, this is not the same as permitting an officer to testify as to knowledge that another officer possessed in order to justify the other officer’s conduct.
This Court has never applied the fellow officer rule, as the Fourth District did in Ferrer, to allow an officer who had no firsthand knowledge of the reasons for the stop and was not yet involved in the investigation to testify regarding what the initial officer told him in order to establish the validity of the initial stop. To do so would be inconsistent with the rationale and holding articulated in Peterson. Moreover, we reject the State’s argument that Lara v. State, 464 So. 2d 1173, 1177 (Fla. 1985), set forth a broad rule that hearsay is always admissible in a motion to suppress hearing.

Citations to authority have been omitted to make for easier reading. This opinion delves deeply into the Federal history of the fellow officer rule and is a good source for authority, although now you will only need this one citation.

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Evidence from Recorded Communications by 911 Operator


PE - Bus Dispatcher MTA_1041

PE - Bus Dispatcher MTA_1041 (Photo credit: Metro Transportation Library and Archive)

This is an interesting case regarding wireless communication interception by a 911 operator.  The case deals with chapter 934 which should be required reading for all graduating high school students and anyone getting married (not to mention lawyers).  It seems that I’ve copied the entire opinion – I have not.  The full opinion goes into the legislative history that supports the decision.

PERDUE v. STATE, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D305b (Fla 1st DCA, Feb 2, 2012) – Perdue raises two issues in this direct appeal of his convictions and sentences: 1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress an audio recording made by a 911 dispatcher, and 2) that section 893.13, Florida Statutes, is facially unconstitutional. We affirm the second issue without further comment based on Flagg v. State, 74 So. 3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), and we reverse the first issue for the reasons that follow.

On January 17, 2010, a dispatcher with the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office, received a 911 call from a woman reporting a disturbance occurring at her daughter’s house next door. The woman gave the dispatcher the telephone number for that residence, and the dispatcher called the number to see if anyone there needed police assistance. After the line was answered, the dispatcher heard screaming and yelling in the background. No one said anything on the line; the line was simply open, and the dispatcher could hear a male threaten to shoot everyone in the house and himself. This call was recorded. Perdue moved to suppress the recording of the outgoing 911 call. He argued that the recording violated section 934.01(4), Florida Statutes (2009), and his right to privacy. After a hearing at which only the 911 operator testified, the trial court denied the motion. The court determined that the recording fell within the exception in section 934.03(2)(g)2, which the court broadly construed to allow an emergency agency to intercept and record any wire communication in order to acquire necessary information to render aid and assistance.

Section 934.03 prohibits the intentional interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications without the parties’ consent or court authorization. However, an employee of an agency operating an emergency 911 system may lawfully intercept and record

incoming wire communications on designated “911” telephone numbers and published nonemergency telephone numbers staffed by trained dispatchers at public safety answering points only. It is also lawful for such employee to intercept and record outgoing wire communications to the numbers from which such incoming wire communications were placed when necessary to obtain information required to provide the emergency services being requested.

§ 934.03(2)(g)2, Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added).

Communications intercepted in violation of Chapter 934, Florida Statutes, are not admissible in judicial proceedings, subject to a limited exception not applicable here. See § 934.06, Fla. Stat. (2009). Accordingly, as the trial court recognized, the disposition of the motion to suppress turns on whether the recording of the outgoing 911 call falls within the exception in section 934.03(2)(g)2.

The plain language of section 934.03(2)(g)2 allows emergency agencies to record only (1) incoming 911 calls, and (2) outgoing call-backs by the 911 dispatcher to the number from which the incoming call was placed when the call-back is necessary to obtain information required for emergency assistance. The statute does not allow other outgoing calls by the 911 dispatcher to be recorded without the consent of the person being called, even if the outgoing call is in reference to or relates to an incoming 911 call.

The Attorney General reached the same conclusion in Advisory Opinion No. 2002-56. There, the Attorney General was asked whether an employee of a municipal police department may record “an outgoing call made in reference to the recorded incoming call, if the outgoing call is made on the same line on which the incoming call is received.” See Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 2002-56 (2002). The Attorney General answered that “[a]n outgoing call may be recorded only when it is made to the telephone number from which an emergency assistance request call was made in order to obtain information required to provide the emergency services being requested or when a called party gives permission for the call to be recorded.” Id.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we reverse the denial of the motion to suppress.

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Florida 2d DCA conflicts on Gant Issue with 5th DCA


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STATE, v. McCULLOUGH, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D49b (Fla. 2d DCA, Dec 30,2011) – The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting Sharon Laverne McCullough’s motion to suppress evidence seized following her arrest. Because the search of McCullough’s car was illegal under the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), we affirm.

McCullough was arrested during a “warrant round-up.” The arresting officer executed the warrant after McCullough pulled into her private driveway. She had already exited her vehicle and locked her door when the officer approached her. After McCullough locked the vehicle door, the officer effectuated the arrest under the outstanding warrant by instructing her to put her hands behind her back for handcuffing. Before being handcuffed, McCullough threw her vehicle keys to her son, who entered the residence at which the car was parked. McCullough was then escorted into the patrol car “without incident.” No evidence was presented that the officer could see any contraband or evidence of any crime inside the car. The officer then went to the door of the home and instructed McCullough’s son to give him the keys. After McCullough’s son complied with this instruction, the officer returned to the vehicle, unlocked it using McCullough’s key, and conducted a search inclusive of McCullough’s purse that was inside the car. The search revealed cash, marijuana, and cocaine inside McCullough’s purse.

The State argues on appeal that because the offense underlying the outstanding arrest warrant was drug-related, it necessarily follows that a search of McCullough’s vehicle incident to that arrest was per se reasonable and no further analysis is appropriate. If this reasoning is accurate, then an arrest warrant for a single sale of perishable contraband would authorize a search of the arrestee’s vehicle at any time, whether days, months, or even years later, despite the fact that it may not be reasonable to believe any evidence of the original illegal act remained. We do not believe this is what the Supreme Court envisioned when it explicitly conditioned the search of a secured arrestee’s vehicle on a reasonable belief that evidence of the underlying offense exists inside.

Gant holds that “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” 129 S.Ct. at 1723. Because it is undisputed that McCullough was secured in handcuffs in the arresting officer’s patrol car when her car was searched, this case concerns only the second prong of Gant’s holding. Accordingly, the search can withstand constitutional scrutiny only if it was reasonable to believe McCullough’s vehicle contained evidence of the offense underlying her arrest. From the officer’s lawful standpoint outside the vehicle, he observed no contraband, weapons, or any other evidence which would support a reasonable belief that evidence from an offense committed at least four months prior — at an unknown location — would exist inside McCullough’s vehicle at the time of her arrest.

Order granting motion to suppress is affirmed. Certify conflict with Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d 671, 677 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).

Eric J Dirga, PA

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